

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

RESPONSE TO NSSM 224

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA

Prepared by the National  
Security Council Interdepartmental  
Group for Africa

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

June 13, 1975

DOS Review Completed.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

EDITOR'S NOTE:

The numbering of pages 24 and 25 of NSSM 224  
are in reverse order.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. Introduction and Summary.....	1
II. Situation and Outlook.....	6
A. Angolan Political Movements.....	6
1. National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA).....	6
2. Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).....	11
3. National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).....	14
4. Coalitions.....	16
B. Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC).....	17
C. Portugal.....	18
III. Decolonization Process.....	21
A. Situation at the Time of the Portuguese Coup.....	21
B. Independence Negotiations.....	21
C. Transitional Arrangements.....	22
D. Violence Endangers Transition.....	25
E. Assessment of Recent Fighting and Political Developments.....	26
F. A New Summit?.....	29
G. Cabinda.....	31
IV. Economic Assessment.....	37
V. External Influences and Interests.....	42
A. Neighboring States.....	42
1. Zaire.....	44
2. Zambia.....	44
3. Peoples Republic of the Congo.....	46

4.	Tanzania.....	47
5.	South Africa.....	48
B.	USSR and Other Communist Countries.....	49
C.	China.....	52
D.	OAU and UN.....	54
VI.	General Conclusions and Prospects.....	55
1.	Transfer of Power.....	55
2.	Violence.....	57
3.	Longer Range Prospects.....	58
VII.	US Interests and Objectives.....	60
A.	Political.....	60
B.	Economic.....	61
C.	Strategic.....	63
VIII.	Key Issues.....	66
A.	Implication of Continued Violence on U.S. Interests..	66
B.	Implications of Victories by the Various Parties.....	68
C.	What Can our Courses of Action be Expected to Achieve?	71
D.	Implications of a Cabinda Breakaway.....	73
IX.	Options.....	77
A.	Neutrality.....	77
B.	Promote a Peaceful Solution.....	79
C.	Actively Support One or More of the Liberation Groups.	81
Annex	Map	

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

## I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

In response to NSSM 224 this study analyzes the current situation in Angola and attempts to project the future trends in the soon-to-be independent territory. It weighs US interests and objectives, the involvement of other third countries, and sets forth options on which United States policy could be formulated.

The study finds the situation in Angola unstable, with continuing factional strife between the contending nationalist parties probable. The presence of Portuguese military forces and perhaps also the recognition of the need to appear ready for independence have kept the contenders from pushing the conflict to the point of full civil war. The point of greatest danger in this regard will be immediately after independence when the Portuguese forces are withdrawn and before the government in power has had opportunity to consolidate its hold.

Neither of the major liberation movements, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) or the Popular

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) commands military superiority over the other. The FNLA has been the stronger throughout most of the period of insurgency, but during recent fighting the MPLA has more often come out on top. The third movement, The National Movement for the Total Independence of Angola, (UNITA), is militarily much weaker than either of the other two groups.

Of the three party leaders, the MPLA's Neto, a Marxist poet, has the greatest intellectual stature. Jonas Savimbi, of UNITA, has appeared of late to be the most pragmatic and practical of the three and is also reputed to be the most articulate and well-informed on current events. The FNLA's Roberto is an anti-communist and close associate of Zairian President Mobutu. Roberto refuses to go back into Angola from Zaire, where he has long lived in exile. His prolonged residence in Zaire appears to hurt the FNLA's chances.

Portugal's primary objective seems to be to cut her losses and to get out of Angola completely and as rapidly as possible. Neighboring African states have provided financial and military assistance to the liberation

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

Movements. For ideological reasons, Congo supports the Marxist-oriented MPLA, while Mobutu has backed the FNLA. Both the Congo and Zaire have their eyes on the Cabinda enclave, primarily because of its petroleum riches and strategic location.

The Soviet Union has long backed the MPLA, and there is evidence it has lately provided the movement with considerable new military equipment. China has had some associations with all of the movements in the past, but is now most closely associated with the FNLA, to which it has supplied military equipment as well as some training.

Because of its important petroleum deposits and large coffee production, Angola is one of black Africa's richest countries. The country's agricultural potential is great--two-thirds of its arable land is not now being cultivated--and significant deposits of other minerals add to the promise of a bright economic future for the country. Angola will, of course, need development assistance for many years to come, primarily because it has such a small pool of trained manpower.

There may be a role for the OAU or the UN in promoting internal stability in Angola or in helping resettle refugees,

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

particularly with respect to Roberto's efforts to move three-quarters of a million Angolan Bakongo back into the country from Zaire where they now live in exile. It should be noted, however, that it is unlikely that the OAU--which strictly avoids interference in the internal affairs of its members--will want to take on the Angolan problem, and so far only UNITA has shown any interest in appealing to the UN for help with their troubles.

A FNLA and/or a UNITA regime would be somewhat easier to deal with than a MPLA government and would probably more readily encourage an interest in mutually beneficial ties. Even so, Savimbi and Roberto are nationalists, who would want to control (or even nationalize) Angola's resources, practice non-alignment, and accept aid from all countries, and support Third World causes.

An MPLA regime would probably try to put the party's socialist doctrines into practice. But practical nationalists might postpone the application of some measures, since even a socialist Angola might well accept foreign investment. Political relationships would not be very cordial; we would probably have the arms-length relationship we have with, say, Algeria or Somalia.



SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

In spite of considerable press coverage in Angola, little public feeling on the subject seems to have been generated in the United States. Congress has shown some awareness of the situation in the former Portuguese colonies as they approach independence and has appropriated modest amounts of assistance for them. As yet there is no substantial Congressional sentiment regarding US policy toward Angola. It can be assumed, nevertheless, that there would be strong Congressional opposition to any US involvement in support of one of the contending factions.

The study presents three options for US policy:

--Neutrality, under which we would make no commitment of US prestige or resources to influence the course of events in Angola.

--Active promotion of a peaceful settlement which, by reducing the chances of a continuing armed conflict, would create a situation in which we believe the FNLA and UNITA might better be<sup>able</sup> to compete with MPLA.

--Providing support designed to help ensure the continued viability of the FNLA and UNITA, with a view to preventing the MPLA from gaining power.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

II. SITUATION AND OUTLOOK

A. Angolan Political Movements. Angola's contemporary political history began with the 1961 rebellion, although two of the present contenders--FNLA and MPLA--date from the 1950s. Both began armed resistance to the Portuguese in 1961, and both have been bitter antagonists almost from the beginning. They were joined by a third movement, UNITA, in 1966.

1. FNLA. Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) grew out of the political ferment among the Bakongo people during the 1950s. The Bakongo, who inhabit lower Zaire and northern Angola, are FNLA's base of support, and the movement's tribal identification has limited its popularity. FNLA attacks in northern Angola in March 1961 signalled the real beginning of the rebellion, and the bloody initial actions gave Roberto a reputation for "barbarism" that persists to this day among many Portuguese. The FNLA traditionally has had close ties with Zaire. The OAU recognized it as the "Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile" (GRAE) from 1963 until 1971, when

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

recognition was withdrawn in an effort to promote unity among the Angolan movements. The loss of OAU recognition and the attrition of the long guerrilla war combined to bring the movement into decline by the early seventies.

At the time of the Lisbon coup, FNLA fortunes were beginning to improve. With encouragement from Zairian President Mobutu, who was attempting to improve his credentials as an African nationalist and broaden Zaire's relations with other powers, Roberto visited Peking in January 1974 and secured a pledge of military assistance. Mobutu increased his assistance to the FNLA, especially in logistical support and training.

With this support, the National Front has been able to move troops quickly into northern Angola and Luanda, and is thus establishing a major military base in northwestern Angola to replace the training and support facilities the FNLA has long maintained in Zaire. The FNLA probably already has about 10,000 troops inside Angola, and Roberto hopes to bring in an additional 8,000 Angolan recruits from Zaire within the month. Angolan refugees in Zaire constitute a substantial reservoir for FNLA recruitment.

## SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

The FNLA may be strengthened by the support of Daniel Chipenda, the former vice president of the MPLA who defected from the MPLA earlier this year. Chipenda controls some 2,000 well-trained troops in eastern Angola.

The National Front is operating under marked disadvantages, however. It has less support in Luanda than does the MPLA or even the UNITA; it has virtually no following south of Luanda--an area that includes about three-fourths of the country. Moreover, the FNLA is not likely to gain significant new support from whites in the near future. Unlike its rivals, the FNLA has never sought to attract a broad multi-racial base of support. Moreover, many whites in Angola have not forgotten the indiscriminate attacks on them by the FNLA when the insurgency broke out in 1961. As a result, the Front has been tagged with a racist image that will be difficult to overcome.

Roberto's refusal to appear in Angola, because he fears assassination and realizes that he probably cannot "turn out the crowds" as his rivals have been able to do, has hurt his own political image, and he has found it difficult to coordinate his group's political and military operations from Zaire.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

Over the years, Roberto's highly personal leadership and his unwillingness to compromise have produced chronic friction within the hierarchy of his organization.

The Front's close relations with Mobutu are a political liability for Roberto in competing with the other two groups, which accuse the Front of being a tool of Mobutu, who, they suggest, has territorial designs on Angola, and particularly the oil-producing enclave of Cabinda. The Roberto-Mobutu connection is viewed with particular suspicion by Agostinho Neto, leader of the MPLA.

The FNLA controls the Agriculture, Interior, and Health and Social Affairs portfolios in the Transitional Government and has ambitious plans for repatriating perhaps as many as 750,000 pro-Front refugees currently living in Zaire in time for them to vote in the constituent assembly elections that are scheduled to be held sometime before independence next November.

Future Prospects. Having consolidated its forces in its Bakongo tribal strongholds in the extreme north, the FNLA will not allow itself to be pushed any further. Despite its threats of retaliation, it will need time to recover from its recent losses and to rethink both its military and political strategies. Barring any

serious reverses to MPLA fortunes, it may be difficult in the near term for the FNLA to regain recently lost territory.

Despite its current financial difficulties, the FNLA probably will be able to gain enough backing to maintain a credible military threat to the MPLA. The reported rift between Mobutu and Roberto is likely to be short-lived, since their common opposition to Neto provides a strong motive for continuing their long-standing alliance, notwithstanding their differences over Cabinda.

Perhaps the most important step to strengthen the FNLA position would be for Roberto to return to Angola and take over direction of the FNLA organization in-country. Until that happens, it is unlikely that the FNLA will achieve its full potential.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM2. Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)

The MPLA originated as a part of urban intellectuals with a pronounced mestizo character and a strong Marxist strain. It began its insurgent activity in 1961 in northern Angola and Cabinda from bases in Congo, but did not become a significant military threat until late in the decade after it had shifted its headquarters to Zambia and was able to make substantial advances into eastern Angola.

A key to the organization's effectiveness over the years has been the ability and high motivation of its well educated, Marxist oriented leaders. They have sought, with some success, support from all segments of the Angolan population--including whites--by stressing that the movement is national and multiracial rather than tribally oriented. The leadership itself has included mulattoes and reportedly some whites, although nearly all the rank and file have been black Africans.

Agostinho Neto, a Portuguese-educated physician and poet, became MPLA President in 1962 and has attempted to fashion a strong, centralized party.

The Popular Movement enjoys strong support from labor unions and other urban elements, particularly in Luanda, the capital. Neto has also long enjoyed wide support among Angola's predominantly white class of

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

intellectuals and professionals, who were careful to hide their sympathies during the Salazar and Caetano regimes. These sympathizers comprise an important part of the Angolan civil service and are apparently prepared to use their positions to boost Neto. Many journalists also support the Popular Movement, an important factor now that it holds the information portfolio in the transitional government.

Long considered militarily weaker than the FNLA, the Popular Movement has recently made significant gains. With only a couple of exceptions, it has bested the FNLA in the numerous clashes that have occurred between the two groups in recent months in Luanda, northern Angola, and Cabinda. The MPLA probably can field as many troops as the FNLA. MPLA troops appear better trained and motivated than their rivals. Moreover, the MPLA can mobilize large numbers of civilians it has armed, particularly in Luanda, which gives it a major advantage. The MPLA's training and recruiting facilities apparently are not as extensive as those of the FNLA, however.

The degree and significance of Soviet influence on the MPLA is difficult to assess, but military and other support from the USSR and other communist countries has been of major importance to the party. Lately, the MPLA apparently has been seeking to develop ties with Peking.



SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

Neto's avowed Marxism and close relations with the Soviet Union limit his general appeal throughout Angola and with neighboring African leaders.

Prospects for the Future

The MPLA probably will not press its current military initiatives to the point of all out civil war and will take time to consolidate its recent gains. The MPLA will find it difficult to win significant new political support or to translate military successes into permanent political advantage. Deficiencies in the quality of the MPLA's political and military leadership and internal differences over strategy and tactics will probably continue to be significant short-term handicaps.

One possibility that cannot be discounted entirely is that the MPLA might attempt to gain exclusive control in Luanda and its immediate environs and then, with the help of the more militant non-aligned countries, seek international recognition as Angola's legitimate government. Such a move would be extremely risky because it would provoke vigorous military opposition from its rivals and their backers, and because of the great uncertainties as to whether the MPLA could receive sufficient outside political and military support to sustain the coup.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM3. National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)

The least powerful of the three groups is the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), established by Jonas Savimbi in 1966 after a split in the FNLA.

Since the coup in Lisbon, Savimbi has emerged as the most active and politically skillful of Angola's three nationalist leaders. This is a significant gain for Savimbi who, throughout the period of the Angolan insurgency, had achieved little notice as the little-known head of the territory's smallest and seemingly least effective nationalist group.

It was largely because of Savimbi's service as an intermediary that Roberto and Neto agreed to the negotiations that led to the independence accord. Savimbi is reputed to be the most articulate and best informed of the insurgent leaders.

Savimbi apparently believes that his organization can attract enough support to give it a strong voice in a coalition government, but it is far from certain that his political skills can win him a leading role in an independent Angola.

Savimbi's popularity is based on tribal ties with the Ovimbundu, the largest ethnic group in Angola, who inhabit

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

the densely populated and prosperous central highlands, and who constitute about one-third of Angola's population. These tribal ties give Savimbi a potential political base out of proportion to the size of UNITA's military forces, which number approximately 3,000 trained troops. UNITA has had no difficulty in attracting large numbers of recruits and now has an estimated 6,000 troops in various stages.

Savimbi maintained his headquarters inside Angola during the insurgency and operated without significant outside support. This has enabled him to claim he is not obligated to or under the influence of foreign powers.

Savimbi's ability to survive inside Angola has prompted his rivals to charge that he made a deal with the Portuguese. This accusation has not hurt him so far, however, and seems unlikely to do so in the future.

Future Prospects.

It will be difficult for UNITA in the short term to translate its real popular support in the highlands into a military capability sufficient to ensure its survival against possible attacks by its rivals. Savimbi will therefore continue his delicate balancing act in an effort to prevent the outbreak of full-scale hostilities that might engulf and overwhelm his organization.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

If the worst occurs, Savimbi will almost certainly seek accommodation and collaboration with whatever group gains predominance in Angola rather than risk the destruction of the organization he has worked hard to build for nearly ten years.

Savimbi probably will have increasing success in winning African and other outside political support for this organization and possibly for his ideas about containing the conflict in the territory (e.g., an arms embargo).

#### 4. Coalitions:

UNITA is the key to the formation of any twoparty coalitions. An FNLAMPLA alliance is clearly out of the question. The most likely combination is one that would link UNITA and the FNLA, since both Savimbi and Roberto share a deep distrust of Neto.

As a pragmatic politician of demonstrated flexibility, Savimbi could conceivably decide at some future point that an alliance with the MPLA against Roberto is in his best longterm interest. For the present, however, Savimbi will continue to resist being drawn into ironclad alliances with either group because he fears that any such alliance could in itself precipitate civil war.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEMB. The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC)

The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) re-emerged last summer after almost a decade of inactivity. Rival factions of the front have established headquarters in Kinshasa and Brazzaville. Although both factions maintain representatives in Cabinda, the bulk of their military forces--probably no more than several hundred each--are in various stages of training in Zaire and the Congo. For both Mobutu and Ngouabi would appear to favor an independent (oil rich) Cabinda over which they could exercise strong influence. Thus, Zaire and Congo are each backing a FLEC faction, although this hardly squares with their support, respectively, of the FNLA and MPLA, both of which insist on Cabinda's remaining an integral part of Angola.

## SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

Future Prospects. Despite its desire to achieve Cabinda's independence from Angola, FLEC is in no position to drive out the liberation groups. FLEC leaders apparently believe, however, that over the long run, fighting among the Angolan liberation groups and continued support from Zaire and the Congo will eventually put them in the dominant position in Cabinda.

C. PORTUGAL

Portugal's principal interest in Angola is peaceful disengagement, preferably with retention of cultural and economic links to the former territory. However, the deteriorating security situation in Angola threatens to become a major contentious issue dividing both the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement and the civilian political parties. Already, some Metropolitan troops are refusing transfer to Angola and Portugal's willingness (and ability) to guarantee internal security in the territory is an open question.

Even without the spectre of open warfare, the Armed Forces Movement (AFM), was not of one mind on how to deal with the Angolan problem. Many AFM members-- the most prominent of whom is Admiral Rosa Coutinho-- are sympathetic to the MPLA. Perhaps an equal number favor strict neutrality toward the contending liberation groups. In Angola, AFM representatives are similarly

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

divided. The High Commissioner, who has maintained an even-handed position toward the groups, is under heavy pressure from many of his colleagues in Angola and Lisbon to favor the MPLA.

There appears to be little the MPLA's sympathizers in the AFM can do for the MPLA in terms of tangible assistance. The AFM is preoccupied with political problems at home and its own resources are too limited to allow substantial diversion of arms or money to the MPLA.

Most AFM representatives agree that Portuguese troops in Angola will not intervene on behalf of any of the liberation groups and that they cannot be counted on to restore order if an all-out war between the MPLA and the FNLA occurs.

Portugal maintains about 24,000 troops in Angola, most of which are stationed in and around Luanda. Those in the countryside are stretched thin. In the recent fighting in northern Angola between the MPLA and the FNLA, Portuguese military officials in Luanda had difficulty moving troops into the area and restoring order.

Future Prospects.

The major Portuguese Government objective in Angola is to get out--with honor if possible, but in any case to get out. Subject to this overriding goal, the Portuguese are doing what they can to maintain the peace and to compose differences among the liberation movements. Both Portuguese will and capacity with respect to Angola are limited--and diminishing--and Lisbon could not impose a settlement that was not acceptable to the parties.



### III. DECOLONIZATION PROCESS

A. Situation at the Time of the Portuguese Coup. At the time of the coup, the liberation was stalemated. In the east, the MPLA was badly split between Neto's supporters and the "Eastern Revolt" faction under Daniel Chipenda. Chipenda had withdrawn his forces from Angola to Zambia, seriously impairing the movement's effectiveness. UNITA's action was largely confined to thinly inhabited areas away from the major centers. The FNLA insurgency had been brought under control in the north. The FNLA, however, had just struck a deal with the PRC under which the Chinese agreed to train and equip about 5,000 FNLA troops in Zaire.

The Portuguese were unable to defeat the insurgents, but were able to keep them in check. The situation was not comparable to that of Mozambique in 1974, where the area of rebel activity was clearly expanding.

B. Independence Negotiations.

The military leadership which ousted the Caetano regime on April 25, 1974, at first promised Angola self-determination but not necessarily independence. It was thought that Angola's economic importance, the disunity among its liberation groups, and the presence of 350,000 white settlers would make the decolonization process slower than in Portugal's other African territories. By July, however, political changes in Lisbon had begun to accelerate the transfer of power despite sharp antagonisms between the liberation movements and the internal disunity of

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

22

the MPLA. Angola's neighbors (Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania, and the Congo) pressured the liberation groups in vain to bury their differences, and negotiations among the groups in Bukavu (Zaire) in July and in Lusaka in August failed to create a basis for agreement between the movements. Differences in Portugal, which culminated in President Spínola's resignation in September, continued to hamper forward movement as well. Nevertheless, UNITA's Savimbi eventually negotiated separate cooperation agreements with Roberto and Neto and persuaded the two to sign a nonaggression pact with each other.

At Mombasa (Kenya) January 3-5, 1975, the three nationalist leaders agreed to form a common front to negotiate with Portugal. On January 15, after five days of intense negotiations between the Portuguese and the liberation movements, an independence agreement was signed at Alvor in southern Portugal. The agreement:

- set November 11, 1975, as the date for independence;
- provided for a transitional government under which Portugal and the three movements would jointly administer the territory until independence;
- declared that Cabinda would remain part of Angola; and
- provided for the integration of the military forces of the three movements into a national army.

Transitional Arrangements.

The transitional administrative structure outlined in the Alvor agreement is a complex and delicate mechanism so

designed as not to give one movement an obvious advantage over its rivals. None of the movements' leaders participate directly in the government.

The agreement also calls for each movement to contribute 8,000 men toward the national army; Portugal is to provide 24,000. Portuguese troops in excess of the 24,000-man limit have been withdrawn. The remaining Portuguese troops are scheduled to leave between October 1, 1975 and February 2, 1976. The agreement does not prevent the liberation movements from maintaining their own separate forces in addition to those they must contribute to the national army.

General elections for a Constituent Assembly are to be held by October 31, 1975. Only the liberation movements will be permitted to run candidates. The Assembly is to draft an independence constitution, which will outline the procedures by which Angola's future government will be chosen. An electoral commission, on which each liberation movement will have equal representation, is to draft an election law.

The fact that the four parties were able to reach any agreement at all was a major achievement. But making the complex arrangement work has proven even more difficult than the negotiations which produced it. The complex checks and balances, established to prevent independent action by any one group, also virtually preclude effective action on the myriad problems confronting the

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

--None of these ideas is likely to win favor with either Roberto or Savimbi, both of whom have insisted that the elections be held as scheduled. But both are aware that Neto could delay the elections simply by tying up the joint commission which is charged with drafting and implementing an election law. They may, in the end, acquiesce in a compromise. Savimbi has indicated that he might countenance a continuation of the present coalition government, provided its decision-making procedures were modified and its legislative authority greatly expanded.

--Both Roberto and Savimbi will pressure Neto to abandon his disruptive tactics--the stepped-up importation of heavy arms; the arming of civilians; and the attacks against the FNLA. They are likely to underscore their warnings with the threat of a military alliance against the MPLA.

--Savimbi will probably demand that both the MPLA and FNLA comply fully with the Alvor agreement's provisions on the integration of military forces, which he sees as one means of diluting the partisan influence of the movements over their troops and reducing the threat of civil war. Both Roberto and Neto will probably agree, but their compliance

decisions on the modalities for constituent assembly elections.

D. Violence Endangers Transition.

Meanwhile, the FNLA and MPLA have been trying to settle their differences by force, and efforts to achieve a meaningful "integrated" or national army have met with little success. Major outbreaks of violence during the past three months all but destroyed earlier hopes that the Alvor agreement would provide an adequate framework for a peaceful transition to independence.

Sources of Tension. All three movements, the MPLA and FNLA in particular, have pursued their own political and military interests without regard for, and frequently to the detriment of, the Transitional Government. Other factors which will continue to contribute to the rapid escalation of tensions are:

- The buildup by all three movements of their military forces in the territory.
- The introduction of new and heavier arms into the territory, especially by the MPLA and FNLA.
- The arming of civilians, particularly by the MPLA. Recent agreements to disarm civilians will be virtually impossible to enforce, even if all parties make a serious effort.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

- The movement's inability or unwillingness to exercise effective control over their own forces.
- The aggressive use of military force by MPLA and FNLA to secure and expand their territorial bases to independence. With independence scheduled for November 11, the pressure of time is forcing each movement to stake out and defend its territory now.
- Uncertainties surrounding the continuing power struggle between leftists and moderates in Lisbon and its likely impact on Angola; and very importantly,
- The provisions of arms and assistance by outside powers.

E. Assessment of Recent Fighting and Political Developments.

MPLA. The MPLA deliberately provoked confrontations with the FNLA in Luanda in March and April in order to:

- dispel rumors that the movement was on the verge of collapse;
- force the postponement of cancellation or the elections, which many believe will reveal the movement's limited popular support; and
- possibly induce the AFM in Lisbon to intervene militarily on its behalf.

The recent fighting has improved the MPLA's fortunes and given the movement renewed confidence. While it cannot

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM. UNCLASSIFIED DISSEM

claim to have won any decisive victories in the Luanda fighting, it was more than able to hold its own against more numerous FNLA troops. The MPLA also initiated the fighting north and east of the capital in late May, and successfully regained previous MPLA areas of influence that recently were occupied or infiltrated by FNLA forces.

In Cabinda, where it has numerical superiority, the MPLA successfully drove FNLA forces out of Cabinda town in early June.

Most of the recent fighting has occurred in areas where the MPLA has strong popular support, Cabinda being the notable exception, and the MPLA has been unsuccessful in areas where FNLA has equally strong local support.

FNLA. The clashes in Luanda, as well as the fighting north and east of the capital, have tarnished the FNLA's image as Angola's most effective fighting force. FNLA forces have failed to distinguish themselves, partly because they found themselves operating in hostile territory in and around Luanda, but also because of their own inability, despite superior numbers, to organize an effective military operation.

The FNLA's attacks on civilians during the Luanda fighting and its inept public relations have also damaged the image of moderation and responsibility that Roberto

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

has attempted to project in recent months. Moreover, the FNLA's hopes of winning new support among the Ovimbundu have not yet materialized. Also potentially damaging to the FNLA are its current difficulties in obtaining adequate financial backing and Roberto's reported differences with President Mobutu of Zaire over the question of Cabinda.

Despite its recent setbacks, the FNLA remains a credible force over which the MPLA cannot hope to prevail in the near term. The FNLA easily drove MPLA garrisons out of the two predominantly Bakongo districts of Uige and Zaire in the north and has reinforced its positions with troops from its camps in Zaire.

UNITA. The escalating violence between the MPLA and FNLA has made it increasingly difficult for UNITA to remain above the fray. Both the FNLA and the MPLA have sought UNITA's cooperation in schemes to eliminate its chief rival. But as the weakest of the three movements militarily, and lacking the outside backing available to the others, UNITA continues to believe that its interests, and Angola's as well, will be best served by a political solution and the avoidance of all-out civil war.



SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO UNCLASSIFIED DISSEM

Both the MPLA and FNLA are eyeing UNITA's turf in the populous and economically important central highlands as an area in which they would like to win new political support. Savimbi has tried, thus far without apparent success, to persuade both the MPLA and FNLA to limit their military presence in the highlands.

Nevertheless, UNITA still seems confident of its ability to maintain firm political support among the Ovimbundu and related tribes.

F. A New Summit?

A number of constraints have thus far induced the movements to maintain at least a facade of cooperation and prevented the increasingly frequent and violent flareups from escalating into full-scale civil war:

- a general desire not to delay independence and the final Portuguese withdrawal;
- an eagerness to avoid being held responsible for a breakdown of order;
- the uncertainty of all three movements about their chances of emerging victorious in a no-holds-barred military struggle;
- the continued, though diminishing, presence and influence of Portuguese troops and the even-handedness of the Portuguese High Commissioner, notwithstanding the evident preference of more radical AFM elements in Lisbon and Angola for the MPLA;

--fear of each movement that a breakdown might

bring increased foreign involvement on behalf of its rivals (e.g., Zaire and possibly the US and PRC on behalf of the FNLA; the Soviets and other communist countries on the side of the MPLA);

--UNITA's willingness to use its forces and influence to maintain a rough equilibrium between the MPLA and FNLA.

There is no assurance, however, that these constraints will continue given the new tensions and the now greatly increased potential for conflict in Angola. The three movements evidently agree that a major new attempt at reconciliation is required and have tentatively agreed to hold a new summit meeting in mid-June. This would be their first joint meeting since the Alvor negotiations in January.

Each leader will be pursuing radically different objectives:

--Neto, who first proposed the idea of a summit to discuss modifications in the Alvor agreement, will probably argue for a postponement of the scheduled constituent assembly elections until after independence. Failing this, he may put forward his case for a single combined candidate slate that would include representatives of all three movements and a restriction of the voting to the larger towns.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

in the future is unlikely to differ from their evasive performance in the past.

A new summit meeting offers some hope for a temporary reduction of tensions, but odds are greatly against any new understanding among the three leaders that would significantly improve prospects for a peaceful transition. The pattern of intermittent, but limited, fighting, edging toward the brink of civil war, is likely to continue until independence. It is highly unlikely that any one group or combination of groups will be able to gain a decisive advantage during the next several months, because of the entrenched support each has in different parts of the territory. The period of greatest turmoil is likely to come immediately after independence, when virtually all Portuguese troops are scheduled to be withdrawn and the movements will be left more or less to themselves to sort out Angola's troubled political future.

G. Cabinda.

1. The Prize. Separated from the rest of Angola by the Zaire River and a Zairian corridor forty miles wide, Cabinda has a total land area of 3,800 square miles and an estimated population of 80,000. Gulf Oil discovered substantial offshore reserves there in 1966.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM, CONTROLLED DISSEM

- Initial estimates were that the Cabinda fields contained at least 2 billion barrels.
- Gulf's production rose to 150,000 bpd in 1974 (half of that shipped to the US), accounting for 87 percent of Angola's total production and making it black Africa's third largest oil producer after Nigeria and Gabon.
- In 1974, Cabindan oil accounted for 40 percent of Angola's total export earnings and 48 percent of its tax revenues.

2. Separatist Groups. The modern Cabinda separatist movement dates from 1959 and is now organized into two principal rival factions of the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC). One faction is supported by Zaire, the other by the Congo. Both factions lacked military force until very recently. Several hundred FLEC troops are being trained in Zaire, possibly by North Korean instructors who arrived in March to train Zaire's army. Others are based in the Congo and since March have received weapons and military equipment from the USSR. Both factions have been strengthened by the addition of Cabindan former paramilitary troops in the Portuguese army who gained experience fighting the MPLA in Cabinda.

3. The Liberation Movements. The otherwise divided Angolan liberation groups are united in their denunciation of Cabindan separatism. The MPLA, which established bases in the northern tip of Cabinda and was the only movement to conduct operations in the enclave during the mid-sixties, holds the preponderance of military force. Both UNITA and the FNLA have established smaller garrisons there since January. Relatively peaceful coexistence among the three groups in the enclave was abruptly ended when MPLA forces drove FNLA troops from Cabinda town in early June.

4. Interested Neighbors. The Congo and Zaire, at the risk of damaging their respective client relationships with the MPLA and FNLA, have openly endorsed Cabindan independence. Both the Congo and Zaire believe they can more readily exert their influence over a Cabinda separated from Angola, and both look covetously at Cabinda's oil. Both countries have stationed troops along their borders with Cabinda. Following the successful MPLA attack on FNLA garrisons in Cabinda city, Zaire's President Mobutu reportedly offered to support a combined FNLA-FLEC counter-offensive and to augment their forces with Zairian troops. That counter-offensive appears to have been deferred pending the outcome of Portuguese efforts to restore order in the enclave.

Mobutu and Congolese President Ngouabi have assured one another that neither will move to annex the territory by force, and these assurances have formed the basis for their joint campaign to sell the idea of Cabinda's self-determination to the OAU. Nevertheless, the possibility clearly exists for an eventual Congolese-Zairian clash over Cabinda.

Of the two countries, Zaire has the greater stake in the future of Cabinda. Mobutu fears that an unfriendly independent Angola might interfere with Zaire's access to the sea. If the opportunity arose, and the risks could be minimized, Mobutu no doubt would prefer a Cabinda joined to Zaire, or failing that, an independent Cabinda under Zairian tutelage.

There are substantial deterrents, however, to any Zairian effort to change Cabinda's political status.

--The OAU's attitude. Direct political or military intervention would almost certainly bring OAU condemnation. The traditional OAU position has been that inherited colonial boundaries should not be changed. Recent meetings of the OAU Council of Ministers and heads of state responded icily to Congolese-Zairian efforts to win support for Cabindan self-determination.

--Relations with Angola's post-independence government.

Zaire's long common border with Angola and its continued dependence on the Benguela railroad through Angola to export copper make it important for Mobutu to have good working relations with whatever government emerges in Angola.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM UNCLASSIFIED DISSEM

5. Prospects.

Mobutu will nevertheless remain sensitive to opportunities that might allow him to gain a foothold in Cabinda.

--Prolonged civil disorder in Angola would probably improve Zaire's chances of detaching Cabinda.

--Civil disorders in the enclave itself would provide an obvious pretext for Zairian intervention, either directly or through encouragement to the pro-Zairian FLEC group.

--Mobutu's chances for realizing his objectives in Cabinda would clearly be enhanced if he could persuade Roberto or some other Angolan leader that the enclave was a necessary trade-off for vital political and military support. This bargain thus far has proved impossible to strike.

Mobutu's Cabinda policy will probably continue to be a delicate balancing act between his goals in the enclave and his broader objectives in Angola. If his efforts to ensure the emergence of a friendly government in Angola are unsuccessful, his Cabindan aspirations will gain greater importance. He will continue to regard direct military intervention as a last resort, but one which he may be prepared to venture in order to protect what he regards as Zaire's vital interests in Cabinda.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

The Congo's priority between its support of the MPLA and of Cabinda separatism is not clear and may not yet have been decided. Its attitude on an arms embargo proposal may give an indication, since an embargo would hurt the MPLA and weaken its chances of gaining superiority in Angola and controlling Cabinda's destiny.

The MPLA's expulsion of FNLA forces from Cabinda town in early June may have been part of a conscious offensive campaign to consolidate control of areas where it is already present in strength. The MPLA is unlikely to try to take control of the entire enclave at this time, for fear of alienating Congolese support and inviting Zairian intervention.

The two FLEC factions, which lack military muscle, now reportedly are receiving weapons and training from Zaire and Congo respectively. They may in the future be more inclined to take on the Angolan movements, especially if prolonged fighting in Angola proper leads the liberation groups to reduce their forces in the enclave.



SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

## IV. ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT

Angola has a per capita income of about \$517 (the third highest among independent African countries after Gabon and South Africa and just under that of Brazil) and probably enjoys one of the best development potentials in the Third World.

The Angolan Government projects a 112 percent increase in budgetary revenue from petroleum in 1975 compared with 1974. This is a reasonable figure so long as Gulf's Cabinda fields remain in operation. At the same time, the reported economic dislocation in the rest of the economy (notably in the coffee plantations and diamond fields) could have a significant adverse effect on Angola's GNP. Coffee and diamond export earnings in 1974 were unofficially estimated at about \$172 million and \$72 million respectively.

The likelihood of serious transitional economic difficulties during the period immediately ahead does not detract from the strength of the country's underlying natural resource base. Of particular importance is the fact that Angola will not suffer from population pressure in the foreseeable future. About six million people, living in a country approximately twice the size of Texas, results in a population density of only 4.6 per

## SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

square mile. Moreover, 50 percent of the population occupies only 9 percent of the land area of the country. Vast stretches of usable agricultural land are largely uninhabited. With a modicum of stability, Angola should continue to feed itself without difficulty.

A refugee resettlement program for Angola being designed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and that already underway under the sponsorship of the U.S. Baptist Church seek only to cover the interim needs and requirements of returning refugees until crops are planted and harvested. We understand the cost of the projected UNHCR program for Angola will be comparable to that for Mozambique.

(UNHCR Program for Mozambique totals \$7.15 million of which we would be prepared to provide up to 25 percent if funds were available).

Angola's present and potential mineral resources are impressive. In 1974, crude oil production amounted to 169,000 barrels daily making Angola the third largest producer in sub-Saharan Africa. Production in Angola has been increasing at a faster rate over the past two years though it remains a small percentage of the total. Export earnings from crude petroleum amounted to an estimated \$429 million in 1974. Last year Angola supplied

## SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

a little over 2 percent of US oil imports. While at present Angola's oil production is centered in Cabinda and in the north of Angola, oil fields extend all along Angola's coast on the coastal plain and the continental shelf, and a number of oil companies have concessions in this strip. Production for the early 1980s is estimated at about 250,000 barrels daily.

The second most important mineral export is diamonds and new deposits, estimated at 3 million carats, have been found in the Lunda district. Angola could also double its present production of iron by 1980 if important deposits of medium and low grade ore in southern Angola are exploited. Large deposits of manganese have been found, estimated at 65 million tons, and there are other important deposits of copper and of phosphate where the reserves in Southern Angola are estimated to be more than 100 million tons. An accurate and complete picture of Angola's mineral resources and potential will have to wait for a survey of the country.

Angola's present and potential agricultural resources are equally impressive. Angola is the fourth largest coffee producer in the world and the second largest in Africa after the Ivory Coast. In 1973 about half of Angola's coffee crop was exported to the United States. Angola also grows a large number of other crops: bananas,

## SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

tobacco, corn, sugar cane, oilseeds, wheat and rice. Angola is almost completely self sufficient in meat and, according to a recent study, could support a livestock industry of nearly 35 million head of cattle.

The growth in petroleum earnings in recent years has dramatically strengthened Angola's external and internal accounts. In 1973, Angola financed an estimated \$200 million in capital flight, eliminated \$133 million in commercial arrears, and still enjoyed a \$12 million balance of payments surplus. Trade figures for the first half of 1974 show a doubling in export value against only a 30% increase in import costs. As a result, Angola's 1974 trade surplus could have reached \$700 million.

The health of Angola's external accounts is reflected in its internal finances. Budgetary revenue which totaled \$484 million in 1974 is projected to rise to \$740 million in 1975 of which projected oil receipts account for \$497 million.

The basic conclusions are evident. So long as Angola retains control of Cabinda, there would appear to be little need for capital development assistance. At the same time, the economy is becoming increasingly dislocated by the political instability and the departure of the skilled Portuguese community. If the Portuguese

## SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

cannot be induced to remain or return, Angola will require substantial technical assistance not only to train its own highly unskilled population but also to keep the economy functioning. Given the country's excellent natural resource base, development prospects for a reasonably functioning Angolan economy are good.

Recent Economic Situation.

Due to the political instability of the last weeks, Angola's economic situation has worsened. A recent strike of Luanda port workers, though supposedly settled, has resulted in increasing delays and spare parts shortages. Coffee production has fallen drastically, and, according to one estimate, the next coffee crop may be only 20 percent of last year's crop. Angolan coffee reserves are high but a protracted production drop could be very serious. Local commercial supply firms have stopped granting short-term (30-90 days) credit, and local banks report that uncollectable debt is piling up rapidly. Diamond operations also seemed to have halted. Though Cabinda oil production has not been seriously affected thus far, and provides the major share of government revenue, oil companies have slowed down exploration programs until the political situation is resolved.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

## V. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES AND INTERESTS

A. NEIGHBORING STATES1. ZAIRE

- a. Zaire is tied to Angola by historical, ethnic, economic and strategic considerations and has nurtured the FNLA since the latter's inception. Zaire's reasons for attempting to influence Angolan affairs include:
- Strategic interest created by the difficulty of defending the 1,500 mile frontier which splits several major tribes, including the Bakongo which provides the FNLA power base.
  - The presence of some 750,000 Angolan Bakongo refugees in Zaire.
  - The attraction of access to Cabindan oil revenues now intensified by Zaire's current financial difficulties.
  - The economic importance to Zaire of the Benguela Railroad which transports ore through Angola from the copper-producing Zairian province of Shaba.
- b. Mobutu and his predecessors have backed Roberto extensively--providing military training,

## SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

bases, food, clothing, medical supplies, some arms and ammunition and financial support used to pay the FNLA's troops and to press the FNLA's political interests. In addition, Mobutu has actively engaged in promoting the external interests of the FNLA through use of his and Zaire's prestige and influence.

- c. Assurance of a friendly successor government to the Portuguese in Angola has been President Mobutu's principal foreign policy preoccupation for the past year. A secondary objective has been to bring about separation of Cabinda from Angola. The most vital parts of Zaire's economic infrastructure (major dam, power transmission and copper facilities) are located close to the Angolan border and are thus vulnerable to attack, and Angola/Cabinda stand athwart Zaire's narrow corridor to the sea. For personal and ideological reasons, Mobutu regards an Angola dominated by Agostinho Neto as intolerable and has sought to prevent this first by providing political and material support to the FNLA and the Chipenda faction

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

of the MPLA and more recently by promoting cooperation between the FNLA and UNITA. He has also exerted diplomatic pressure on Portugal to abandon its tilt toward the MPLA. In recent months, Zaire's own financial straits have limited Mobutu's ability to commit material resources to pursuit of his objectives, but he remains committed to excluding Neto and the radical wing of the MPLA from power in Angola.

- d. Mobutu's policy of supporting Cabindan independence is a source of strain in his relations with the FNLA and UNITA. He continues to provide financial assistance, training, and equipment to the FLEC army.

## 2. ZAMBIA

- a. Although Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda has played a more even-handed role in Angolan developments than Mobutu, Zambian interests in Angola are no less great. Zambia is more dependent than Zaire upon Benguela Railroad for transport of much of its only important export, copper. Kaunda has repeatedly stressed the need for unity among the Angolan nationalist movements, and, above all, his desire for a peaceful transition to independence which would minimize



SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

delays on the railroad and eliminate current labor problems at the port resulting from political uncertainty and unrest in the territory.

- b. During the insurgency, Zambia lent its support to both the MPLA and UNITA. UNITA, because of its occasional attacks on the Benguela Railroad, was barred from Zambia in 1967 and was not permitted reentry into the country until after the 1974 coup in Lisbon. There was, however, no disruption in Zambian support to the MPLA, which received material aid, safe-havens, and permission to conduct operations into Angola from Zambian territory. Despite this consistent support, Kaunda has developed a personal animosity toward Neto, and in recent months has come to view him as a divisive factor in the Angolan equation and not the man to lead an independent Angola.
- c. As his disenchantment with Neto and the MPLA grew, Kaunda became increasingly impressed with UNITA President Jonas Savimbi. Savimbi's "hands-off" policy in the MPLA-FNLA conflict, demonstrated popularity and his pragmatic

## SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

approach to Angola's problems probably contributed to Kaunda's apparent switch in sympathies. Although Kaunda holds no personal dislike for the third major contender, FNLA President Holden Roberto, he distrusts Roberto's association with Mobutu and believes Roberto has only limited support among the populace of Angola. Thus, Kaunda--together with Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, and perhaps Mobutu as well--now seem to view Savimbi as a compromise leader who might be able to reconcile or accommodate partisan interests and bring off a peaceful transition to independence.

- d. Despite Kaunda's preference for Savimbi, he recently has told Savimbi that Zambia cannot meet an earlier commitment to provide UNITA with one-half of its arms requirements. Kaunda explained that he is taking a leading role in efforts to affect an arms embargo on Angola, and it would be embarrassing to him if it were discovered that Zambia was continuing to supply weapons to UNITA at this time.

3. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

- a. President Ngouabi would like to see Cabinda established as an independent state under a

## SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM, CONTROLLED DISSEM

leadership influenced by and beholden to the Congo. Eventually, Ngouabi believes, this could lead to a political union between the Congo and Cabinda. To achieve this end, the Congolese actively support a faction of FLEC, the Cabindan separatist group, and have a former Premier of the Congo, Alfred Raoul, ready to step in as the first President of Cabinda.

- b. The Congo has also assisted the MPLA, giving it safehaven bases, air and sea logistical support, and financial assistance. The MPLA has relied heavily on Congolese help and influence to maintain itself as a viable organization and a contender for power in Angola. The Congolese in turn see the MPLA with which it shares a Marxist orientation, as the most sympathetic of the Angolan groups. The principal difference between the two is the Congo's support of the MPLA is obviously incompatible with its support for FLEC in Cabinda. Nevertheless, it continues to support both.

#### 4. TANZANIA

- a. Tanzania has been a continuing element in the Angolan problem principally because of President

Nyerere's personal interest in Angola, his

inclusion as one of the four African presidents appointed by the Organization of African Unity to deal with Angolan problems and, by extension, his efforts to bring the nationalist movements together.

- b. During the Angolan insurgency, Tanzania directed its support primarily to the MPLA and, specifically, to serving as a pipeline between the USSR and the MPLA and to providing some training facilities for MPLA forces. Despite Tanzania's longtime support for the MPLA and its president, Nyerere has recently indicated that his sympathies have swung to UNITA President Savimbi. Nyerere, like Zambian President Kaunda, has become disenchanted with Neto. His switch to Savimbi is motivated by considerations similar to those of Kaunda.

5. SOUTH AFRICA

- a. South African interests in Angola focus on the Angolan-Namibian border, on the separatist activities of the Ovambo tribe which inhabits both sides of that border, and on South African economic investments in Angola which include the large Kunene hydroelectric scheme and

private investments in Angolan diamonds, minerals, and the Benguela Railroad. The South Africans also maintain a consulate in Luanda. Pretoria is concerned that a communist or otherwise unfriendly regime in Luanda might support guerrilla activity in Namibia and foster serious problems along that border. However, South Africa does not seem to be planning action to counter this threat and, in fact, gives little indication that it sees any need to formulate an Angolan policy at all.

#### USSR AND OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

The USSR has backed the MPLA since 1956 when the movement was founded with the aid of the small, clandestine Angolan Communist Party. Competition with the Chinese has now become a factor in Soviet support for the MPLA. Other communist countries, such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, are also now giving military assistance.

During the early years of the insurgency, Moscow provided the MPLA with a steady supply of financial and military aid, most of it channelled through the Congo, Zambia and Tanzania. In about 1971 or 1972 Soviet interest in the MPLA appeared to wane because of the serious factional struggle within the movement that had

## SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

seriously weakened its ability to conduct insurgent operations. Soviet interest picked up, however, following the coup in Portugal in April 1974, and by mid-summer renewed Soviet support to the MPLA was evident. We are unable to determine the quantity of military assistance being provided by the USSR and other communist countries. In Soviet terms the magnitude probably is not great, but for the MPLA material assistance from communist countries is of major significance. The major part now appears to be channelled primarily through the Congo. From there it is transshipped into Angola, frequently through Cabinda, by air and by sea. As many as six Soviet aircraft, for example, off-loaded military equipment in Brazzaville in March for transshipment to Cabinda. According to the Portuguese High Commissioner in Luanda, a steady supply of military equipment has been delivered to the MPLA since at least October 1974.

Despite the USSR's support of the MPLA and its apparent interest in helping an ideologically congenial party come to power, Soviet policy objectives in Angola are not clearly definable. The USSR could find its continued involvement in Angola a source of increasing embarrassment, particularly if concerned African states

## SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

(e.g., Zambia) begin to criticize openly the contribution of Soviet arms shipments to the escalating violence in Angola and to increasing tensions in the area. The Soviets would appear to have few, if any, important economic or strategic interests in Angola, and their support for groups in Angola and Cabinda appears to be dictated by their desire to maintain credibility and influence with their various clients--the MPLA, Congo-Brazzaville, Algeria and the Portuguese Community Party--and to protect its image as a supporter of anti-colonial liberation struggles. This motive probably explains the pattern of Soviet aid and involvement in Angola. It would also suggest that the Soviets will maintain careful limits on their involvement and a close eye on the reactions of other states with which it wants to maintain good relations.

c. CHINA

As part of China's general interest in Africa and its liberation movements, the Chinese provided token support to UNITA during the early years of the insurgency. After Zairian President Mobutu established relations with Peking, however, in 1974 the Chinese began aiding the FNLA. While Mobutu presumably encouraged such assistance, the Chinese no doubt also saw in the FNLA a means to compete with Soviet interests in Angola as represented by the MPLA. In January 1974 the Chinese agreed to provide 100 military instructors and equipment to the FNLA. These instructors, together with the Zairian military, have since been providing the basic military training that the FNLA receives. The Chinese recently agreed to continue this assistance until the end of 1975. This assistance has not served to change the FNLA's political orientation along Chinese lines.

Continuing Chinese contact with UNITA and the MPLA is perhaps indicative of Chinese interest in maintaining contact with whatever group may come out on top in Angola. In the late 1960s several UNITA members were given "political" training in Peking, although this has had no noticeable effect on UNITA. More recently, in July 1974, Savimbi



## SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

was given \$40,000 in Chinese assistance. Since then, the Chinese have promised military equipment to UNITA, but no deliveries have been made as yet. Chinese support to the MPLA during the insurgency was negligible, limited by Chinese awareness of the Soviet influence on the movement. It was for this reason that MPLA President Neto came away empty-handed from a visit to Peking in 1971. A high-level MPLA delegation has just completed a visit to Peking, however, the first by MPLA since 1971, and subsequently reported to the press that the Chinese would aid all factions equally.

Prospects

The PRC may be having some second thoughts about its present relationship with the FNLA, a relationship it probably entered into primarily as a gesture toward improved relations with Mobutu. It recently has been careful to maintain contacts with all three liberation movements and has taken no sides in the polemical war over which should govern Angola. It may provide limited financial and military support to all three in an effort to retain a position of influence regardless of who governs after independence. But it probably will continue to avoid being drawn any deeper into an uncertain situation in an area of the world where it has no important political, economic or strategic interests.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

D. THE OAU AND UN

Both the MPLA and FNLA are at present strongly opposed to any OAU or UN interference in Angola; only UNITA sees OAU/UN intervention as a possible means of stabilizing the political climate in Angola.

Members of the OAU are divided in their support for the three liberation movements. In the absence of a consensus, the OAU will continue to deplore Angolan disunity and violence (and, without specifically naming them, those outsiders who encourage civil strife), but is unlikely to intervene directly.

It is unlikely that the UN Secretary General would seek an expanded political role without explicit approval from the three Angolan parties and at least the tacit approval of the OAU. Enlargement of his role could include reinforcing the Secretary General's representatives in Angola and including political good offices in his present mandate. Since the Angolan problem is viewed primarily as an African matter, both inside and outside the continent, it is unlikely that the OAU or principal African states would consider requesting a UN peacekeeping initiative such as the positioning of UN observers or the actual presence of peacekeeping forces.

## VI. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS

### 1. The Transfer of Power

a. Political Solutions. There is little doubt that Angola will become independent on November 11, but at this point the circumstances under which it will do so are not auspicious. The prospects for a political solution that would head off serious violence were always uncertain, but a number of constraints thus far have induced the movements to maintain at least a facade of cooperation.

b. Erosion of Constraint. Recently, these constraints have been eroding. Hopes for a relatively peaceful transition have dimmed as the movements have resorted increasingly to force to improve their positions. Armed forces are getting stronger and, as independence nears, stakes are getting higher.

c. Summit Prospects. Prospects for the success of such a summit are at best cloudy, since each leader will be pursuing radically different objectives. A meeting might temporarily reduce tensions, but the odds are greatly against any new and fundamental understanding among the three leaders, that would significantly improve the outlook for a peaceful transition. At this point, it seems unlikely that they would do much more

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

than negotiate--in effect--a truce of uncertain but presumably limited duration.

2. Violence

a. Nature of the escalation. Recent confrontations, provoked by the MPLA, have resulted in a significant improvement of MPLA's military fortunes at FNLA expense and made it increasingly difficult for UNITA to maintain its preferred role of neutral mediator above the fray. The escalating violence is marked by increasing racial tensions, the steady buildup of military forces with new and heavier arms and less effective control of troops by their leaders. The pressure of approaching independence is forcing each movement to stake out maximum territory now.

b. Where is it heading? We believe that the current pattern of intermittent but limited fighting, edging toward the brink of civil war, is likely to continue until independence. It is highly unlikely that any one group or combination of groups will be able to gain a decisive advantage during the next several months. The period of greatest turmoil is likely to come immediately after independence.

The prospects for further escalation clearly exists and could take several forms:

--Organized warfare between the MPLA and the FNLA or an FNLA-UNITA alliance, resulting from a preemptive initiative or a miscalculation, and resulting in the destruction of one or the other. This would require that the Portuguese and outsiders stay out.

--Generalized anarchy resulting from the buildup of hatreds between the movements, frustration at the lack of political or social progress, the seemingly unlimited availability of arms, and the habit of violence. Mob action could escalate in the city and banditry could pervade the countryside.

--Regional separatism could be encouraged by the breakdown of order. The southern Cunhama may be tempted to swell the ranks of the related Ovambos in Namibia or to join forces with them to try to form an independent state. Cabinda could attempt independence or be annexed by Zaire or the Congo. Movements with a strong regional base may simply create quasi-independent fiefdoms under the nominal authority of a weak central government. This is more likely than formal partition of the ethnic groups into

independent states which would require international acquiescence.

3. Longer Range Prospects

a. A long period of political instability is likely. Any one movement--or even an alliance of two--will probably not be able to maintain effective power without strong coercive measures. Given Angola's size and ethnic diversity, continued resistance of the "outs" against the "ins", by the insurgent warfare in which they have long experience, is a distinct possibility even after an independent regime has been installed and ratified by popular mandate.

b. Partition will remain a real possibility. Increasingly, divisions among the liberation movements are reinforcing traditional tribal and ethnic divisions. This is particularly true in the north where fighting between the MPLA and FNLA has resulted in the formation of a line that roughly separates the Kimbundu from the Bakongo. The fact that some regions could become economically viable as independent states reinforces secessionist tendencies.

c. Nevertheless, there are factors which tend to hold the country together. Portuguese cultural influence and the economic structure will continue to

independent states which would require international acquiescence.

3. Longer Range Prospects

a. A long period of political instability is likely. Any one movement--or even an alliance of two--will probably not be able to maintain effective power without strong coercive measures. Given Angola's size and ethnic diversity, continued resistance of the "outs" against the "ins", by the insurgent warfare in which they have long experience, is a distinct possibility even after an independent regime has been installed and ratified by popular mandate.

b. Partition will remain a real possibility. Increasingly, divisions among the liberation movements are reinforcing traditional tribal and ethnic divisions. This is particularly true in the north where fighting between the MPLA and FNLA has resulted in the formation of a line that roughly separates the Kimbundu from the Bakongo. The fact that some regions could become economically viable as independent states reinforces secessionist tendencies.

c. Nevertheless, there are factors which tend to hold the country together. Portuguese cultural influence and the economic structure will continue to

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

be unifying factors. Moreover, it is significant that all of the present movement leaders aspire to national rather than regional leadership. Finally, the strong OAU tradition against altering colonial boundaries will provide a negative pressure against change.

d. Given the high susceptibility of all the potential leaders to assassination, it is difficult to predict the evolution of the liberation movements. They might not survive the disappearance of their leaders, or they might change significantly in character and policy.



SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

## VII. US INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

### A. Political

#### 1. Interests

Our political interest in Angola itself are important but by no means vital. They are:

- a. The role and influence that Angola will exercise on peace, stability and progress in central and southern Africa;
- b. The stand that an independent Angola will take on major world issues and in world fora such as the OAU, UN, OPEC, etc.

As a relatively large and potentially prosperous country with close ethnic and economic ties to Zaire, Zambia and Namibia, Angola will have a significant influence in this area of southern Africa. Continued violence and chaos in Angola will strengthen the hand of white extremists in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa, sharpening confrontation, retarding change and increasing prospects for larger scale violence. As an independent country Angola can also be expected to play a key role in the OAU and the UN as well as in other African and world fora.

#### 2. Objectives

Our political objectives are:

- a. To have a post-independence Angolan government that is relatively stable and which will adopt a

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

policy of cooperation and friendship with the United States.

b. To contain the present conflict to Angola, to minimize the involvement of other powers and to foster a peaceful transition to independence.

c. To have Portugal accept its full responsibilities in maintaining peace and order until independence and carry out its promise of free elections for a constituent assembly.

d. To have Angola's neighbors use their influence with the liberation movements to end the fighting and proceed to independence via elections of a constituent assembly.

B. U.S. Economic Interests in Angola

U.S. economic and commercial interests in Angola are essentially three-folds: protection of U.S. investments, promotion of U.S. exports and continued access to Angola's raw materials.

The United States is by far the most important foreign investor in Angola. American investment there is presently estimated at \$400 million of which \$300 million represents the Gulf Oil investment in Cabinda. By agreement with Gulf the Angolan Government will acquire 55 percent ownership of the concession in return for \$85 million.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

Several other U.S. petroleum firms also have interests in Angola. Texaco has made a reportedly sizable find offshore from Angola proper earlier this year and has begun to produce. Exxon, Sun Oil, Hess, Cities Service, Occidental, Amoco, and Conoco have exploration concessions in various coastal and offshore areas from Cabinda to Benguela.

Other important U.S. mineral interests include Rayn and Guggenheim investments in diamonds, Chromalloy American's investment in a gold mine, and Tenneco's exclusive concession for the exploration and production of sulphur and gypsum.

Angola is, after Nigeria, the second most important trading partner of the United States in Black Africa. U.S.-Angolan trade rose to \$440 million in 1974, over double the value for 1973. U.S. imports alone from Angola in 1974 amounted to \$378.2 million and could reach over \$500 million in 1975, based on first quarter data. The United States is the most important customer for Angola's exports (primarily coffee and petroleum) and is the third most important source of Angolan imports.

The market for U.S. products in Angola has grown steadily. U.S. exports to Angola increased from \$38.0 million in 1973 to \$61.8 million in 1974. First quarter 1975 exports to Angola are up again, reaching \$17.5 million

(a yearly rate of \$70 million). The exports are largely those in which the U.S. is highly competitive or very specialized. Oil well structures, materials handling equipment, railway equipment, tractors, construction and mining equipment, heating and ventilating equipment, and pumps, valves and compressors lead the export list. The Benguelan and Angolan rail lines have been using GE locomotives for over a decade. The market for U.S. exports should continue to grow.

Given a favorable political climate, Angola is one of the potentially most attractive trading and investment partners for the United States in Africa.

#### C. U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

U.S. strategic interests in Angola are not vital but are important and likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. This strategic importance is derived from Angola's location along the sea and air lines of communication between the U.S. east coast and the Indian Ocean, its proximity to the established routes of the large oil tankers around the Cape of Good Hope to Europe, and the lack of U.S. access to port and airfield facilities in most of the other nearby countries. We want continued access for port visits, overflights, and landing authorizations in Angola.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

In this regard, present U.S. government policy precludes U.S. Navy port visits to either South Africa or Namibia; it is questionable as to whether the post-independence government of Mozambique will permit such visits, and the present policies of Tanzania and the Malagasy Republic prohibit U.S. port calls. Thus, Angolan ports are the final ports of call available for refueling, resupply or other support and shore leave while enroute around Africa to the Indian Ocean. Currently EC135 supporting NASA and AFETR launches, plus regularly scheduled MAC C141 aircraft, get Lisbon clearances to overfly Angola enroute to Johannesburg and return. Should overflight rights of Angola be denied, the U.S. government would be placed in the awkward position of having to request overflight of Namibia proper (vice the Caprivi strip) or would have to fly around Namibia on flights to South Africa. The Foreign Clearance Guide indicates South Africa will prohibit U.S. aircraft entrance should obvious attempts be made to circumnavigate Namibia. In addition, the future possible need for an alternate air route into the Indian Ocean area is another valuable consideration.

Equally important is the objective of preventing our potential enemies from achieving a position of influence which would allow the area to be used exclusively by their

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

armed forces for operational purposes, thereby extending their military capabilities.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM

VIII. KEY ISSUES

A. Implications of Continued Violence on US Interests.

The longer the present violence in Angola continues, and the more it escalates, the more likely it will be that the United States interests in the country will suffer. The only important American physical assets in Angola are those of the oil companies, principally the Gulf facilities in Cabinda. These installations could be damaged if the fighting continues and extends, and, if the situation becomes embittered enough, one of the losing contenders might decide to sabotage the oil installations in order to deprive his opponent of the profits from the fields.

Continued fighting will bring with it other, less direct, implications for the United States. If the fighting becomes intense, it will have ever greater effects on the population and on the country's economic production. We could, ultimately, find ourselves faced with the necessity of assisting in emergency relief operations, providing food, medical care, and temporary housing to those affected in the fighting. Continued combat could

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

also threaten the Benguela railway, making it difficult for Zaire to export much of her copper, thus increasing Zaire's financial crisis.

Finally, continued fighting in Angola will alarm the white populations in Namibia, Rhodesia, and South Africa, making them even more fearful of black majority rule. This would tend to discourage the moderates and strengthen the hand of the extremists in these governments, exacerbating the confrontation between black and white Africa. The United States is much more likely to encounter problems, both politically and economically, from embittered struggles in the remaining white-ruled southern African countries, particularly in South Africa, where we have major economic interests, than from anything that might happen in Angola.



SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEMB. Implications of Victories by the various Parties.

On the basis of our current knowledge and perceptions of the liberation movements we have made certain assumptions about the kinds of regimes they would form if they were free to do so, and the likely implications those regimes would have for US interests in Angola and southern Africa. Realistically, however, it is by no means certain that any movement -- or even a combination of movements -- would be able to "win" in the sense of imposing its rule on the whole of Angola.

MPLA -- We assume that the MPLA, because of its marxist organization and orientation, would establish a highly-centralized and authoritarian one-party regime with a pronounced socialist orientation and close ties to the communist world--possibly not unlike Guinea.

Nevertheless, we can probably expect Neto to establish some balance in his foreign relations in order to maintain his non-aligned and Third World credentials.

He will probably want to establish at least minimal ties with the U.S., including diplomatic relations. But

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

this might depend on what role we were perceived to play in the immediate pre-independence period. In any case, there will not be a great deal of warmth in the relationship.

He will continue his established ties with western European countries (e.g., the Scandinavians) and is likely to accept development assistance from both communist and non-communist donors. Like two other Marxist African governments, Guinea and The Congo, an MPLA regime may also accept foreign investment (under carefully controlled conditions) in order to accelerate Angola's economic development.

Under these circumstances, an MPLA-ruled Angola might not be intolerably inimical to U.S. economic interests. A marxist Angola would almost certainly nationalize Gulf Oil's operations, but this would probably occur sooner or later under any independent Angolan government. There is no reason to suppose that a socialist Angola will refuse to sell us its oil or other mineral production, since the United States will probably be more important to Angola as a customer than Angola will be to us as a source of supply.

SECRET/NO FOREIGNCONTROLLED DISSEM

FNLA -- We know less about Roberto's vision of Angola's future, but tend to suspect that the FNLA would be strongly nationalistic, necessarily more coercive because of its rather narrow political base, less ideological and more highly personalized -- perhaps similar to Zaire.

Although Holden Roberto is identified in African and Soviet eyes with the United States (and with the United States' supposed client, President Mobutu), our contribution to the FNLA has been minimal. Consequently, Roberto will have little reason to be beholden to us.

The FNLA's apparent lack of strong ideological inclinations would not necessarily imply that the United States would have a clear field in an Angola under Roberto's presidency. Like Neto, Roberto will want to maintain good African and Third World credentials and is likely to join the non-aligned consensus on most international issues. Like Mobutu, Roberto would probably accept development and/or military assistance from East as well as West. Again, following Mobutu's example, Roberto could be expected to nationalize Angola's major productive enterprises, but

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

would probably be more hospitable toward selective U.S. investment in Angola than would Neto.

Whereas Neto would most probably refuse us access to Angolan ports and airfields for strategic purposes, Roberto probably would extend bunkering rights for U.S. naval vessels and overflight clearances for U.S. military aircraft enroute to South Africa and the Indian Ocean area.

C. What can our courses of Action Be Expected to Achieve?

It cannot automatically be assumed that the destruction or elimination of the MPLA would serve U.S. interests in Angola, as previously described in this paper. Elimination of the MPLA--even if it were possible--might create a situation in which latent hostilities between the FNLA and UNITA would erupt in open conflict. Thus, for the U.S., a more limited and realistic objective would be to prevent the MPLA from gaining predominance in Angola, especially by military means.

If the conflict in Angola were purely or primarily political, we believe the FNLA and UNITA have sufficient

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

popular support and organizational strength to compete with, and probably predominate over, the MPLA. The immediate problem is how to make them strong enough militarily vis-a-vis the MPLA to prevent their being destroyed. This objective theoretically could be accomplished either by:

--limiting the outside support which in recent weeks has given the MPLA a military advantage;

--increasing the strength of the FNLA and/or UNITA;

--or both.

Each of these course has its own advantage and liabilities. There is some questions as to whether efforts to limit arms to the MPLA would be made effective. The chances of it being so seem measureably improved, however, in view of the decision by Zambia and Tanzania to embargo arms to Angola and Zaire's apparent willingness to cooperate. There is also a chance that the Congo can be persuaded and/or constrained to participate. While their combined efforts would greatly affect the flow of arms, it probably would not cut the MPLA off altogether from its outside sources of supply.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

Supplying UNITA and/or FNLA with arms (or the money with which to buy them) would obviously improve their fighting potential. It would not, however, offer any guarantee of their ultimate success. Aside from arms there are other variables in the equation--such as ability to recruit, the quality of leadership and training, organizational capabilities, popular support, etc.--which are probably more important and over which we and other outsiders have little or no control. Moreover, arming the movements equally might merely encourage the kind of all-out civil war that would have serious long-term consequences for the stability of the country and the region.

D. Implications of a Cabinda Breakaway.

A successful Cabindan secession from Angola would face us with two interrelated problems:

--the future of the Gulf Oil investment and our access to Cabindan oil;

--the international implications (e.g., Zairian and/or Congolese involvement, Angolan efforts to recover Cabinda), and their effects on U.S. relations with the major actors.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

The circumstances of a Cabindan breakaway would in part, determine the implications for the U.S. Secession would be most likely if Angola proper were paralyzed by violent political confrontations. Some degree of Zairian and/or Congolese involvement would be a likely component of a successful breakaway. Other, less predictable factors would be the degree of conflict required to secede, and Zairian and Congolese policy toward the new Cabinda regime.

For the U.S., the key questions would be:

-- Would Gulf's investment be jeopardized or protected by the emergence of an independent regime? An independent Cabinda obviously would handle its major asset with great care. But it would certainly want to assure its own control over the petroleum operation--whatever the form of ownership--and would not necessarily be friendlier to Gulf than an Angolan (or Zairian) regime. But the major determinant of the security of Gulf's investment would be the U.S. Government's attitude toward a Cabinda secession.

-- How should the U.S. Government react to a secession in terms of protecting our oil investment, in the long as well as the short term? The only U.S. response that would be likely to affect this question would be the most serious

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

one: would we support (or remain neutral) about a secession, or would we oppose it? The durability of a secession would be a major factor in such a decision; it would probably depend on how determined Zaire and Congo were to support a breakaway regime in the face of the likely uproar throughout Africa. It seems unlikely in any case that an independent Cabinda would remain very long outside the orbit of the Congo or, more likely, of Zaire.

-- How would the U.S. attitude toward secession affect our relations with Angola, Zaire, and Congo? In effect, we might be forced to choose between Angola and Zaire, assuming that Kinshasa was openly or covertly supporting the secession. The Zairians would be in a tight spot--since they would be flying in the face of the OAU's ground rules--and would want all the support they could get. No matter who was running the Luanda government, it would insist on the return of Cabinda and would probably make this a touchstone of foreign relationships. Another side effect of a Cabinda secession might be a Zaire-Congo conflict, with Mobutu and Ngouabi seeking international support for their respective positions.



SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

-- Would our stance toward Cabinda affect our broader African interests one way or another? Secession is such an emotional issue in Africa that anyone seen to be supporting it would be the target of a storm of criticism. (Since Gulf is in Cabinda, however, the U.S. would be criticized anyway, even if it didn't support secession.)

-- Would Cabinda secession trigger a major OAU/UN involvement in Angola? If the OAU and the UN had not previously been deeply involved, a Cabinda secession might well bridge other differences and bring them into Angola. Their involvement in these circumstances might not promote U.S. interests.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEMIX. OPTIONSA. Neutrality

Under this option we would choose not to involve ourselves in the Angolan situation. We would support neither the FNLA nor UNITA. We would indicate our desire to enter into diplomatic relations with whatever government is established in Angola.

Pros:

-- Would not start us down the path into a potentially risky and expensive involvement in a situation whose outcome would be beyond our control.

-- Would leave our options open if we later wished to play an active role.

-- Would not require the Administration to expend any political capital to win Congressional support and/or funding for more action programs.

-- Would permit us to counter charges of manipulation or interference and diminish the validity of charges that the FNLA and UNITA are controlled or are heavily influenced by the United States.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

-- Would be consistent with our frequent public declarations that we do not interfere in the internal affairs of other states.

Cons:

-- Might cost us influence with FNLA and UNITA should they win out over the MPLA.

• -- Would have a negative effect on our relations with Zaire.

-- Would not affect Soviet and Chinese arms supply for the MPLA and the FNLA respectively.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

-- Might reduce the effectiveness of later U.S. assistance should we decide, in an escalated situation, to play an active role.

B. Promote a Peaceful Solution through Diplomatic/Political Measures

This option would be designed to reduce communist support of the MPLA, encourage Portugal to exert its authority in Angola firmly and impartially, and support efforts by African states and others to seek a peaceful solution.

Under this option, we could: urge Portugal to play a stronger -- but impartial -- role; encourage Portugal to press the USSR to reduce its support of MPLA; encourage interested Africans to seek Soviet reduction of its support to MPLA; we could privately approach, or build public pressure on, the USSR to reduce its support of MPLA; or, ultimately, support or promote a UN mediation effort.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

PROS:

-- By shifting competition to the political arena might improve FNLA's and UNITA's position vis-a-vis the MPLA.

-- Would be in concert with Tanzanian, Zambian, and, perhaps, Zairian efforts to reduce the arms flow into Angola.

-- Would reduce the chance of big power confrontation.

-- Would further our policy for supporting peaceful solutions to southern African problems.

-- By being responsive to PG requests that we approach Mobutu would encourage Portuguese efforts towards a peaceful solution in Angola.

-- Would recognize that Angola is basically an African problem, and that the Africans can and should play a major role in its solution.

-- Involvement of this kind would probably elicit Congressional and public support.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEMCons:

-- Would risk alienating the FNLA, and UNITA, which might consider a call for restraint as limiting their freedom of action.

-- Despite assurances of support for peaceful settlement, it is questionable that the USSR and other interested countries would actually cooperate.

-- Would be viewed by pro-MPLA elements in Portugal, Africa and elsewhere as interference in Angolan affairs at a time when MPLA appears in a strong position.

C. Actively Support One or More of the Liberation Groups

This option could come into play if other courses of action meant to encourage a peaceful solution were failing and it was felt that we should act more decisively to enhance the fortunes of FNLA and UNITA. The option can be considered along a spectrum. We could supplement various forms of assistance with a public program in favor of FNLA, UNITA,

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

or both. We could initiate a program of public assistance that would clearly benefit one or another group, e.g. for refugee resettlement which would primarily benefit FNLA, or direct logistical support (vehicles or small aircraft) to UNITA. We could channel military aid through Zaire and, conceivably, Zambia, to FNLA and UNITA. We could directly provide military equipment and supplies including heavy weapons to one or both groups.

Pros:

- Might be effective in preventing an MPLA takeover.
- Could build U.S. political credit with the FNLA and UNITA.
- Could be a signal to the USSR, Portugal, our NATO allies and others that recent events in Southeast Asia have not sapped the U.S. will to act to protect or promote U.S. interests anywhere in the world, including countries of marginal interest to the U.S.
- Would strengthen our relations with Zaire.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEMCons:

① -- ~~Would~~ commit U.S. resources and prestige in a situation the outcome of which is in doubt and over which we can exercise limited influence at best.

② <sup>It</sup> ~~might~~ <sup>also</sup> contribute to increased involvement by the Soviets and other foreign powers.

-- Would be resented by the AFM and public in Portugal as interference in what they view as essentially their problem, on behalf of forces (Roberto) that the Portuguese generally distrust.

③ <sup>would</sup> ~~+~~ Appearing to side with one faction or another entail a high risk of exposure. Such exposure ~~could~~ have a negative impact on our relations with other Angolan factions, with other African states, with Portugal, with Socialist and third world countries, and with large segments of the U.S. public and Congress.

④ <sup>Such action might also</sup> -- ~~Would probably~~ increase the level of violence with all the foreign and domestic consequences that that would



SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

entail for the United States. If widespread tribal or racial massacres occur (a distinct Possibility) our support for one or more of the contending forces could become a significant political issue. /

-- Even with U.S. support, we cannot be sure either Roberto or Savimbi will act in manner favorable to U.S. interests once they come to power.

-- And by taking sides, we would enhance prospects that our relations would be damaged should the MPLA come to power in independent Angola.